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A Theory of Efficiency Wage with Multiple Unemployment Equilibria: 
How a Higher Minimum Wage Law Can Curb Unemployment
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This paper uses efficiency wage theory and the existence of community-based sharing to 
hypothesize that labor markets in developing countries have multiple equilibria – the same 
economy can be stuck at different levels of unemployment with different levels of wages. The 
model is meant for developing economies where wage-productivity links are discernible and 
income-sharing among the poor is prevalent. It seems reasonable to posit that in such an 
economy more unemployment leads to more income sharing. The main results are generated 
combining this claim with a theoretical demonstration of the fact that more sharing increases 
unemployment rates. As corollaries, we show that (1) within the same society, two different 
racial groups that may be ex ante identical can have different levels of unemployment and 
wages in equilibrium and (2) the imposition of a legal minimum wage can raise employment. 
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This paper revisits an early theoretical literature concerning wage rigidity and 
unemployment in developing countries. Starting with the seminal work of Leibenstein 
(1957, 1958), there was a period of enormous research activity, which tried to explain 
wage rigidity and unemployment in poor economies, where a higher wage meant better 
nutrition and greater labor productivity.
1 This literature was very influential; it triggered 
other explanations of involuntary unemployment, which relied on the idea of an 
‘efficiency’ wage as epitomized in the paper by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), related 
economic research to clinical evidence on nutrition and productivity (Dasgupta and Ray, 
1990; Osmani, 1990) and entered textbooks of development economics as accepted 
wisdom (Ray, 1998).  
While this literature successfully explained wage rigidity and unemployment in 
developing countries, it overlooked the possibility of a multiple-equilibria result, which 
can have important policy implications. In this early literature a labor market in an 
economy typically had one equilibrium, which may be one of full employment or one in 
which there is involuntary unemployment. If, for instance, an economy had involuntary 
unemployment, then to shift the economy to full-employment or higher employment 
would require continuous policy intervention, whether it be a legislative measure or one 
involving taxes and employment subsidies or planned public sector employment. 
  This result changes sharply once we introduce a realistic and seemingly 
innocuous assumption into the above models. In much of the Leibensteinian efficiency 
wage models it is presumed that each worker consumes her entire wage. In reality this is 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Mazumdar (1959), Mirrlees (1975),  Rodgers (1975),  Stiglitz (1976),  Bliss and Stern 
(1978),  Agarwala (1979),  Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987), Guha (1989), and Basu (1993). 
  2of course not true. A laborer would typically consume only a fraction of her wage—even 
if it were close to 1. In itself, this would make no difference to the existing efficiency 
wage models, cited in footnote 1. But suppose we assume, realistically, that the fraction 
that a person consumes depends on certain features of the economy, such as the level of 
unemployment.  For instance, if unemployment increases, each worker will consume a 
smaller fraction of her wage, since she would typically be sharing her income with others 
in her community, family or caste-group, who have become unemployed. This 
modification paves the way for a new set of results. The same economy could now have 
several equilibria involving different levels of unemployment, including possibly an 
equilibrium with no unemployment. The standard efficiency wage model is good at 
explaining why economies have open unemployment with rigid wages, but it is ill-suited 
to explain why the same economy can over short periods of time move from one level of 
unemployment to another, with no visible adjustment processes at work.  The present 
paper tries to amend this deficiency. 
  A result of multiple unemployment outcomes occurs in Aghion and Blanchard 
(1994).  Their model is driven by an alternative concept of efficiency wage (one that does 
not affect worker productivity, which does not vary with unemployment levels in their 
model) and results in two unemployment equilibria but one stable and one unstable. On 
the other hand, our model explains the existence of multiple stable equilibria, with the 
important implication that government intervention may be necessary but need not be 
permanent. In a related paper by Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess (1994) there is the 
suggestion of another, more political-economy-driven argument in the context of 
transition economy workers.  Such workers will of course have an interest in maintaining 
  3a low unemployment rate.  The success that they have in this collective objective of theirs 
depends on the support that they can generate among managers by throwing their weight 
against restructuring plans the government may have.  These blocking coalitions can be 
broken by other forces, giving rise to a higher level of unemployment. 
  Returning to the framework of our model, in the structure that we describe, there 
is scope for thinking of policy interventions, which entail a one-time government action 
(or a transitory policy intervention) to deflect the economy from one equilibrium to 
another. More surprisingly, it is now possible for an economy to have one equilibrium in 
which wages are low and unemployment high and another where wages are high with no 
unemployment, which has important implications for minimum-wage policy. 
  The model also sheds light on an inadequately understood feature of labor 
markets, namely the prevalence of divergent unemployment rates among groups or 
communities that are visibly different. Some of the most striking evidence on this comes 
from South Africa, where the unemployment rates across different racial groups can be 
widely disparate (Leibrandt et al., 2003; Casale et al., 2004). This paper helps us 
understand how such differences can be sustained, links these differences to other 
features of the economy and its racial groups, and yields testable propositions.     
The next section presents some of the evidence that motivates this paper, in 
particular, the importance and legitimacy of the claim that people in poor countries share 
resources.  Section 3 presents our basic theoretical model of efficiency wage with 
multiple equilibria in the labor market.  The paradoxical result concerning minimum 
wage legislation follows in section 4.  Section 5 analyzes the role of government 
  4subsidies and how a one-period intervention can cause a permanent change in market 
outcomes.  Section 6 concludes the paper by commenting on some policy implications. 
 
2.  The Empirical Setting 
The mushrooming literature on efficiency wages was a response to the widely 
documented but poorly-understood phenomenon of open unemployment and wage 
rigidity. This literature explained why wages may not decline in the face of 
unemployment. But this literature implies that for each economy there is only one level 
of unemployment that can be an equilibrium. In reality, countries seem to settle into 
different levels of unemployment for certain stretches of time. In the US, during 1991 and 
1992, the unemployment rate was almost 7.1%, but during the years 1999 and 2000, it 
held steady at 3.8%. It has risen back, again, since then.  
Similarly, in societies where the labor market happens to be fragmented, one often 
finds large differences in contemporary unemployment rates. In South Africa, the Labor 
Force Survey of 2003 reports an unemployment rate of 10% for whites and 50% for 
Africans (Casale et al., 2004; Stats SA, 2003). The model we develop below directly 
addresses the subject of different resting points as far as the rate of unemployment is 
concerned. In a case where the sharing of income with the unemployed happens within 
racial groups, one can see why different groups may settle at different equilibria. In South 
Africa, we know that not only do the whites have a lower unemployment, but they earn a 
higher wage. While wage statistics are difficult to find, one can get a sense of this from 
the fact that, in 2003, the monthly real income of Africans was 1,484 rands, while for 
Whites it was 6,372 rands. Can this be explained by the model?  
  5Interestingly, we will see later that the model suggests that an economy can have 
two equilibria: one in which there is no unemployment and wages are high and another in 
which there is unemployment and wages are low. While it is true that Whites in South 
Africa have unemployment, if we correct for the fact that the South African economy is a 
high-unemployment economy in general, the above numbers for Whites and Africans 
could be treated as a stylized empirical counterpart of this result. 
Let us turn now from the implications of the model to the one new axiom that we 
will combine with the standard efficiency wage theory. This axiom asserts that workers 
do not always consume everything they individually earn, but have mechanisms for 
sharing and supporting the unemployed and destitute among them. This can take the form 
of supporting family members who happen to be unemployed but also often has a much 
larger reach, whereby employed people may support members of their community or 
village who run into hard times.    
There is, fortunately, plenty of evidence that there is altruistic-income sharing that 
goes on in poor societies. When one person in the household becomes unemployed, 
others chip in and contribute to that person’s consumption. As Hoff and Sen (2006, p.95) 
point out, ‘the kin system’ may be viewed ‘as a social contract of mutual assistance 
among members of an extended family.’ Since such sharing is not confined to nuclear 
households, the possibility of an employer employing everybody with whom one worker 
shares his wage may not be a realistic assumption. This is so especially in poor 
economies where firms are small.   
If sharing were confined to immediate family members as assumed by Genicot 
(2005), firms could, in principle, employ the whole unit and ensure that the wages they 
  6pay are entirely ploughed back into productivity from which that firm benefits.  Even in 
this case, it is debatable whether employment of the whole family would be optimal from 
the firm’s perspective.  For one, the distribution of skill in a family may not match the 
skills required by the firm.  Regardless, sharing has been documented to occur in much 
larger communities—villagers often have informal credit arrangements available to the 
unemployed and sharing among ethnic groups is evidenced by the increases in 
remittances during bad times.  So it is unlikely that firms will be able to internalize the 
positive externalities of sharing. 
  The solidarity mechanisms that evolve in communities where resources are scarce 
were explicitly pointed out as early as the nineteen forties by Evans-Pritchard (1940).  
Anthropologists were the first to pursue an explanation of this phenomenon.
2  They 
attributed the existence of sharing to morals and ethics, or the existence of a common 
value system that entails the ‘right to subsistence and the principle of reciprocity’ (Scott, 
1976; Popkin, 1979).  They note the precarious nature of survival led to the formation of 
mechanisms by which individuals would share in order to insure against starvation.  This 
is why evidence of solidarity mechanisms exists primarily in pre-industrial and under-
developed economies, and only emerges in developed countries during wartime or natural 
disasters (Fafchamps 1992). 
Economists have also found significant empirical evidence that sharing exists.  
Townsend (1994) notes that an optimal and fully insured arrangement for individual 
consumption within a village is determined as if all crop output were pooled and 
optimally redistributed among community members—this would be the case in which 
                                                 
2 See Cashdan (1985), Kent (1993), Platteau (1997), Cox et al. (1998).  Bardhan (1980) and Platteau and 
Abraham (1987) discuss some of the importance of anthropological findings for economics.  
  7members of the village were sharing resources perfectly amongst themselves.  This full 
insurance scheme means individual crop output would not affect individual consumption, 
which would therefore be entirely explained by aggregate output and individual fixed 
effects.  Since he finds a significant co-movement between household consumption and 
village average consumption in three poor Indian villages, there is evidence that 
individuals in these communities are sharing in order to smooth income shocks.  
Townsend finds own income, sickness and unemployment do not significantly affect 
individual consumption, rather there is a remarkable ability to smooth personal 
consumption with informal credit markets and gifts.
3   
   
 
3.  A Model of Efficiency Wage with Sharing 
Our aim is to develop a model of efficiency wage where a worker’s nutrition and, 
therefore, effective labor depends positively on the wage the worker earns.  This kind of 
labor market modeling for developing countries has a long intellectual tradition dating 
back to Leibenstein (1957) and is also represented in the works of Mirrlees (1975), 
Stiglitz (1976) and Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987).  However, what was overlooked in 
this literature and has important implications for the model is that in all societies—and 
maybe especially so in poor countries—small communities, households and villages have 
informal systems of helping out those who are unemployed and destitute.  
3.1  The Sharing Rule 
We introduce this complication by treating  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ α  as the fraction of a person’s own 
wage that she keeps for herself.  For simplicity we assume that there are no savings in the 
                                                 
3 For other evidence see Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Kochar (2000) and Ravallion and Dearden (1988). 
  8economy.  Hence, if a person’s wage is  , her consumption is  w w α , and () w α − 1  is what 
she contributes for the upkeep of those who are unemployed.  Clearly, then, if U  is the 
unemployment rate in this society, we would expect α  to depend on this.  Hence, 
() U α α = .  In the present paper we use a very simple household model to derive this 
relation.  Assume each household has t adults and   children; and each household 
follows the rule that all adults in the household will have the same consumption and each 
child will consume a fraction 
d
( ) 1 , 0 ∈ δ  of each adult’s consumption.  In a more 
sophisticated model we may allow for power play within the household with gender 
mattering and the breadwinner consuming more than others (Basu, 2006) but these 
complications are unnecessary here. 
We shall in our formal model assume that (a) income sharing takes place within 
the household (which could be large and take the form of multiple families sharing one 
common kitchen, as happens often in poor regions) and (b) that the economy’s total 
unemployment falls equitably on each household.  Therefore, if U  is the unemployment 
rate in the economy, then we assume for simplicity that in each household   adults are 
unemployed.  Hence, if the market wage is   and we use   to denote each adult’s 
consumption, then it must be the case that 
tU
w c
( )tw U cd ct − = + 1 δ .  Since  w c α = , it follows 
that 









,         ( 1 )  
which has the property  ()0 < ′U α . In other words, as employment rises, the contribution 
to the common welfare fund declines.  Assumption (b), described above, is of course a 
strong assumption but it is made for algebraic simplicity.  It is easy to see that the main 
  9results of the model would remain valid under several generalizations (including 
heterogeneity of unemployment across households and even heterogeneity of sharing 
across families).  We shall later consider the case where households in different racial 
groups face different incidences of unemployment.  More generally if we assume that, as 
 increases, each household’s expected unemployment rate rises as does the expected 
amount of sharing in the household, the algebra would be more complex, but our main 
results would be robust. 
U
  In modeling the labor market, we will assume that each agent—that is, each 
laborer and each employer—treats α  as a parameter.  Of course, it is their collective 
behavior that finally determines U  and, through that, α .  But it also seems reasonable to 
suppose that every individual will treat the national employment rate as beyond his 
influence.  This is in keeping with the standard assumption in competitive models that 
each individual treats prices as given. 
3.2  The Quasi Equilibrium 
Let us now turn to the decision problem of the firm.  Following the now-standard analysis 
(see Basu, 1997; Ray 1998) we assume that the number of efficiency units,  , produced 
by a worker depends on the worker’s consumption,  .  In particular, 
h
c
   ,         ( 2 )   () c h h =
where  , for all   (for some  ) and for all  ,  () 0 = c h a c < 0 > a a c ≥ ( ) 0 > ′ c h ,  .  In 
addition   is bounded from above.  Since 
() 0 < ′ ′ c h
() c h ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ α  is the fraction of a person’s wage 
that he spends on his own consumption, if he is paid a wage of  , then  w () w h h α = . 
  10  Assume that in this economy, there are   workers and they supply their labor 
inelastically.
N
4  Also there are   identical firms, each endowed with the production 
function: 
m
   () ,  H f x = 0 > ′ f ,  0 < ′ ′ f      (3) 
where H  is the total amount of efficiency units of labor used by the firm and   is the 
output.  Hence, if a firm pays a wage of   and employs   workers, its profit is given by 
x
w n
   () ( ) ( ) nw w nh f w n − = α π , .       ( 4 )  
We take the price of the product to be 1. 
  The way we develop the model is as follows.  We shall first treat α  as fixed 
exogenously and describe a labor market equilibrium that we shall call an ‘α-quasi-
equilibrium’.  Hence, for every  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ α , there will be an α-quasi-equilibrium.  We shall 
then look for the value of α  that has a self-fulfilling property and use that α  to define a 
(full) competitive equilibrium of the labor market. 
  Let us begin by working out each firm’s unconstrained optimum.  This is clearly 










.  That is, 
   () () ( ) n w h n w nh f = ′ ′ α α α       ( 5 )  
   () () ( ) w w h w nh f = ′ α α        ( 6 )  
(5) and (6) imply 




w h ′ = .        ( 7 )  
                                                 
4 This assumption is purely for simplicity.  An upward-sloping supply curve would leave our analysis 
unchanged. 
  11From (7), we get the ideal wage the firm would like to pay.  This depends on α .  Hence 
we will write this as  () α w .  This is illustrated in Fig. 1. What equation (7) essentially 
says is that firms would like to offer wages where the average product of consumption in 
terms of efficiency units is maximized.  Figure 1 also illustrates explicitly how sharing 
will affect the firm’s wage choice and the efficiency units they get at a chosen wage.  For 
any positive level of sharing ( 1 < α ) firms will offer a higher wage so that  ) ( w h α  
remains constant but efficiency units per dollar  w w h ) (α  is lower than if sharing did not 
exist.  In the Fig. 1 below, the wage,  , chosen by the firm will be such that  w w α  is given 
by the point marked   in the figure.  So, when there is no sharing ( k 1 = α )  and 
when there is sharing, that is 
k w = 0
1 < α , then  α k w = 1 .  It is immediately obvious that 
 —a higher wage is paid when sharing occurs.  1 0 w w <
 
  12  If we insert this in (6) and solve for n, we get  ( ) α n .  Hence, the constrained 
solution of this firm’s optimization is given by:  ( ) α w  and  ( ) α n .  An ‘α -quasi-
equilibrium’ is basically a wage rate which is equal to  ( ) α w  and aggregate labor supply 
that exceeds aggregate labor demand or a wage such that demand for labor equals supply 
of labor and no firm can do better by raising the wage. 
  Hence, in case  () N mn ≤ α , we have an α-quasi-equilibrium in which all firms 
pay a wage of  () α w  and demand  ( ) α n  and there is open unemployment equal to 
() α mn N − .  If we had fixed  1 = α , then this α-quasi-equilibrium is exactly the 
equilibrium described by Leibenstein (1957), Mirrlees (1975) or Stiglitz (1976). 
 In  case  () N mn > α , then clearly firms paying a wage of  ( ) α w  and employing 
() α n  is not feasible.  There will be excess demand for labor and this will drive the wage 
up.  What will the wage be?  To answer this, assume each firm takes the wage rate,  , as 
given.  With   and 
w
w α  as given, the number of workers a firm will demand is clearly 
given by equation (6).  Write this solution as 
   ( w n n , ) ~ α = .         ( 8 )  
  The wage rate   is an α-quasi-equilibrium if  * w ( ) N w n m = * , ~ α . This means that 
if the wage is left to be determined endogenously by the forces of demand and supply, the 
wage will settle at   and there will be no unemployment. * w
5 Since the efficiency wage is 
below   each firm will want to pay a lower wage but in that case demand will exceed 
supply and wage will rise to  . 
* w
* w
                                                 
5 If an individual firm offers a wage below  , no worker will come to the firm; and offering a wage 
above   makes no sense since the firm can hire any number of workers it wants at  , and   is 
above the efficiency wage. 
* w
* w * w * w
  13Two alternative α-quasi-equilibria, for  0 α α =  and  1 α  are illustrated in Fig. 2.  In 
both these cases there is open unemployment in equilibrium.  Note that  0 1 α α <  and 
 —more sharing yields a higher level of unemployment.   0 1 U U >
 
3.3  The Full Competitive Equilibrium 
A (full) competitive equilibrium is now easy to define.  Informally speaking, it is given 
by an  * α  such that the α*-quasi-equilibrium ‘corroborates’ the  * α . 
  It is easy to see that, given any α , in the α-quasi-equilibrium there will be a 
certain unemployment rate.  Let this be denoted by  ( ) α U .  Suppose there is open 
unemployment in the α-quasi-equilibrium.  In that case  ( ) α U  is defined as follows: 







= .        ( 9 )  
And, in case  () α mn N < , then  ( ) 0 = α U . 
  14  Now for a formal definition:   * α  and   constitute a competitive equilibrium if  * U
( * * ) α U U =  and  () * * U α α = .   
  This is essentially a rational-expectations equilibrium.  If all firms assume α  to 
be  * α  and this in turn gives rise to U  that corroborates the  * α , then we have a 
competitive equilibrium.   
  The values of α ,  ,   and U  that occur in a competitive equilibrium will be 
denoted by 
n w
* α ,  ,   and  .  * n * w * U
  We will show that this model can have multiple competitive equilibria with 
different wages and levels of unemployment. 
  To see this, it is important for us to establish an initial result. 
 
Lemma 1: As  α  increases,   increases.  n
Proof:   From the representative firm’s profit maximizing first order conditions, (5) and 
(6) we know  
   () ( ) w h w h w α α α = ′ ,       (10) 
which is, essentially (7) rearranged.  Since α  and   only appear as  w w α  in (10), it 
follows that  w α  is constant.  Let us write this as 




w = ,         ( 1 1 )  
It follows that  () 0 < ′ α w .  Substituting (11) into (5) we get  ( ) ( )() 1 = ′ ′ α k h k nh f  or 




       ( 1 2 )  
Since   is a constant, as  k α  increases  ( ) ( ) k nh f ′  must fall.  Given  0 < ′ ′ f , it follows that  
n must increase.                           □ 
  15  Lemma 1 in conjunction with (9) implies that as long as  ( ) 0 > α U , as α  
increases  () α U  will fall.  Hence,  ( ) α U  and  ( ) U α , as defined, both have negative slopes.  
Therefore, it is entirely possible that they intersect more than once and the economy has 
multiple competitive equilibria.  Figure 3 illustrates a possible case.
6
 
  The economy illustrated in Fig. 3 has three possible equilibria,  ,   and  .  1 E 2 E 3 E
Unemployment is highest at   and lowest at  .  Hence, the same economy can be 
caught in one equilibrium that has high unemployment and another equilibrium that has 
low unemployment. 
1 E 3 E
  Lemma 1 has an important implication about the relation between different 
possible competitive equilibria of an economy.  If unemployment is positive in each of 
                                                 
6 Since, when  , the question of   1 = U α  does not arise, the graph should be thought of as defined on the 
half open interval  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ α . 
  16the possible equilibria, then the lower unemployment will invariably be associated with a 
lower wage as the standard model with legislatively fixed wages would imply.  If 
however one of the equilibria involves full-employment (i.e. zero unemployment) this 
equilibrium can be associated with a higher wage than the other equilibria as we will 
demonstrate in the next section. 
  Our model can also help us understand another widely-observed phenomenon, 
namely that unemployment rates often differ between ethnic groups within the same 
country.
7  This could happen if each sharing community is entirely a subset of one ethnic 
group and if each person’s ethnic identity is easy to observe as would happen with the 
Blacks and Whites in South Africa, for instance.  In one group, characterized by a high 
rate of unemployment, workers will have a greater propensity to share their income rather 
than to consume it themselves.  This fact will lead them to be relatively less productive 
compared to workers from a community with a rather low rate of unemployment and 
little need for income sharing.  Firms will prefer to hire those from the community with a 
low rate of unemployment thereby corroborating the fact of low unemployment.   
  Hence, two geographically neighboring communities could find themselves in 
vastly different labor market equilibria with different race specific employment rates. 
This idea is elaborated on at the end of the next section. 
 
                                                 
7 Barring some non-generic exceptions, what the theory would suggest for economies with integrated labor 
markets is that either one group will have zero unemployment while the other has positive unemployment 
or one group will have total unemployment (that is, no demand for its labor) with the other group having 
higher wages and some unemployment.  The claim can be made more general by introducing some 
frictional unemployment or the existence of some sector-specific firms. These ideas are elaborated upon 
below in this and the next sections. 
  174.  A Paradoxical Result with Implications for Minimum Wage 
Legislation and Racial Dichotomies in Labor Markets 
 
The intriguing question that we raised earlier is:  Is it possible for a country to have two 
equilibria one with full employment and high wage and another with larger (and therefore 
positive) unemployment and a lower wage?  The answer to this question turns out to be 
yes, and this section is devoted to proving this.  This has very interesting implications for 
minimum wage policy and understanding labor market schisms within a society, such as 
South Africa’s.  We comment on these at the end of the section and in the next section.  
Our first task is to demonstrate that the answer to the above question is yes.  We do this 
by constructing an example.  As one works through the example it will be obvious that it 
is not a non-generic special case but one illustration from a class of parameters where this 
pathology can occur.   
  Consider an economy with 120 laborers who supply their labor inelastically, as 
long as wage is non-negative.  Hence N=120.  The economy has 10 identical firms, each 
endowed with the following production function  






H H H f x − = = ,       
where, as before, H  is the total amount of efficiency units employed by the firm.  It 
follows that the marginal production function is give by: 
   ()
18 2
5 H
H f − = ′ .       (13) 
Let the labor efficiency function (that is (2) above) be given by: 



























c h .     (14) 
This is illustrated in Fig. 4 by the line ABC. 
 
  As currently described,   is unbounded.  We can rectify this by setting an upper 
bound on it and have the result unchanged. 
h
  Being non-differentiable (a harmless assumption made for algebraic convenience) 
we cannot determine the employer’s optimal c by differentiating the  -function but it is 
obvious on inspection that the cost of efficiency units of labor is minimized at  .  
Hence, the employer, faced with an 
h
1 = c




= w .        ( 1 5 )  
Hence, the efficiency wage is given by this formula. 
  19 Given  α  and  , if we want to find out the number of laborers demanded by a 










.       (16) 
Consider a special case where 
2
1
= α .  Then  2 = w  and  ( ) 1 = w h α .  Hence we can solve 
(16) and get  .  9 = n
  Since there are 10 firms, the aggregate demand for labor would be 90 and the 
unemployment rate is (120-90)/120 = 1/4 or 25%. 
  Consider now the case where 
3
2
= α .  It is easy to verify that if firms were free to 
pay the efficiency wage, aggregate labor demand (180) would exceed labor supply.  
Hence, in equilibrium firms will be forced to pay a wage above the efficiency wage.  One 
can further check that if with  1 = α , wage was fixed for each firm at 2, each firm’s 
demand for labor would exceed 12.  Hence aggregate demand for labor would exceed 
.  Hence the market clearing wage will exceed 2.  N = 120
  The numbers just derived are illustrated in Fig. 5, where the vertical axis 
represents the reservation wage faced by each firm (i.e. each firm is free to give a wage 
equal to or exceeding the point represented on the vertical axis) and the horizontal axis 
represents aggregate labor supply and demand. 
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 Hence,  if  α  were 
2
1




, equilibrium would be depicted by the point  .  These are, of course,  1 E α -quasi-
equilibria.  To see what α  will prevail in the general competitive equilibrium we need to 




= δ .  Hence, 
   α = () U α =()
3
2
1 U −        ( 1 7 )  
where U  is the unemployment rate. 
  Figure 6 depicts this in the ( ) α , U -space as in Fig. 1.   
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  Given the economy described in this example, we can work out the 
unemployment rate that will occur given each value of α .  We can describe this as 





























⎛ α  and  ()
3
2
0 = α , we have a competitive equilibrium where 
2
1
= α , 
4
1
= U  and   and another competitive equilibrium where  2 = w
3
2
= α ,   and  .  
This establishes the result we set out to prove.
0 = U 2 > w
8
  This result opens up the possibility of unconventional policy interventions.  
Consider the economy described in this example and suppose it is at the equilibrium 
                                                 
8 It is interesting to contrast this result with that of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), where higher unemployment 
is associated with greater worker efficiency.  Of course, the assumptions behind that model were different.  
Our relatively counter-intuitive result calls for future empirical inquiry. 
  22described by   in Fig. 6.  This corresponds to the point   in Fig. 5.  So wage is at 2 
and unemployment is at 30.  Now suppose government imposes a statutory minimum 
wage,  , where  , where   is described in the figure. 
'
0 E 0 E
min w 1 min 2 w w ≤ < 1 w
  This immediately means that the economy can no longer be at   and the 
equilibrium goes to  , where not only is wage higher (as would happen given any 




9  A similar result is known from standard textbook models where 
the labor market is monopolistic or oligopolistic.  What is interesting about our paper is 
that this happens in a competitive model. 
  The above exercise was done in a static setting.  There are important questions 
pertaining to dynamics.  Once a minimum wage is imposed if productivity of workers 
does not respond quickly it may lead to two classes of workers—those who find high-
paid jobs and become more productive and those who lose their jobs and find their 
productive powers eroding rapidly.  This can give rise to interesting possibilities but we 
refrain from going into them in the present paper. 
  The result established in this section also helps us understand a real-world 
phenomenon mentioned above, where two ethnic groups exhibit very different labor 
market outcomes, more than can be explained in terms of differences in human capital or 
preference for leisure.  In South Africa, observers have been baffled by the fact that, 
despite apartheid being abolished, the unemployment rate is so much higher for Blacks 
than for Whites.  Moreover, as discussed above, all evidence suggests that despite this, 
Whites command a higher average wage than Blacks.  The question arises about why an 
                                                 
9 It is worth cautioning that in a different class of models (e.g., Basu et al., 2003) a minimum wage law can 
bring new equilibria into existence. 
  23employer does not replace his high-wage White workforce with Blacks, who will accept a 
lower wage and increase profits. 
  This is such an important and widespread phenomenon that there will no doubt be 
many different explanations of it.  Our model points to an interesting possibility.  
Suppose the sharing of wages occur within racial group.  That is, each group or 
community within which people support and insure one another consists of a subset of a 
single race.  This does not seem to be an unrealistic assumption.  If the sharing occurs 
within each household and households are racially homogeneous then this would be true.  
Assume also, for simplicity, that firms are sector-specific.  For instance, there is an 
exogenously given number of firms in Soweto and these employ only Blacks.  And the 
firms in Sandton employ only Whites.  Now, if Blacks and Whites have different sharing 
norms (that is, given the same unemployment rate,  B W α α ≠ ) then the two groups could 
settle into different rates of unemployment and wages.  What is even more interesting is 
that, even if both groups are identical in every way, including their sharing norms, they 
can, in equilibrium, have different unemployment rates and wages. Of course, which 
equilibrium one settles into may have a lot to do with history and the divisions of history 
are of course especially deep for Whites and Blacks in South Africa.  But this is fully 
compatible with the existence of multiple equilibria. 
  The above argument makes use of the assumption that firms are sector-specific, 
that is, there is an exogenously given set of firms that operate where Blacks live and 
another exogenously given set of firms where Whites live.  If firms are free to move from 
one sector to another then the analysis gets more complicated.  Market schism would still 
occur but one of the groups (say Whites) would have full employment whereas the other 
  24could have large unemployment.  In addition, as we have just shown, wages could be 
lower in the sector that has large unemployment, pretty much in keeping with the 
experience of South Africa. 
  Following the same kind of reasoning another kind of dichotomy of the labor 
market that can arise in a fully integrated labor market is easy to understand. Persisting 
with the assumption of intra-group sharing consider a case where Blacks have higher 
unemployment than Whites and therefore lower α . Clearly firms will prefer to employ 
Whites. One stopping point of this is where Blacks wages are driven down so low that 
Black unemployment is total whereas White wage rises to efficiency level with some 
positive unemployment. Of course reality does not match this polar extreme. But once we 
combine this model with the fact that there will always be some sector-specific firms in 
reality and also that a large fraction of the Blacks in South Africa who are employed are 
actually self-employed, it becomes evident that our model may contain significant 
insights into the stark dichotomies that one sees in some economies such as that of South 
Africa. 
5.  Using Subsidies to Curb Unemployment 
Let us consider a government whose goal is to decrease unemployment and it has some 
funds available to use as subsidies to induce firms to employ more people.  The existence 
of multiple equilibria means that a government seeking to decrease unemployment 
permanently need simply decrease unemployment sufficiently in one period to create a 
permanent change in the unemployment level.  This one period decline in unemployment 
will decrease the amount of community based sharing, by the fact that there are fewer 
unemployed people with which one should share, and make labor more productive, in 
  25terms of efficiency units, to firms.  The increase in the productivity of labor due to less 
sharing will lead to the hiring of more workers and reinforce both the lower levels of 
sharing and unemployment in the labor market.  Given the effect of the one period 
government intervention is large enough, the economy will settle at a new equilibrium.  
Government policy that could deflect a high-unemployment-economy into a new labor 
market equilibrium with lower unemployment could consist of minimum wage 
legislation, a subsidy on output or a one time per worker subsidy to firms.  Minimum 
wage legislation has been addressed previously and this section will be devoted to the 
effects of the latter two interventions. 
5.1 Output Subsidy 
Let us begin by considering an output subsidy.  When the government provides an output 
subsidy the firm’s profit is as follows.   
() () ( ) ( ) nw w nh f s w n − + = α π 1 ,                (18) 
This profit function incorporates the fact that firms now receive a price   for each 
unit of output produced, where   represents the amount of the output subsidy.  The first 
order conditions are: 
( s + 1 )
s
  () () () ( ) [] 0 1 * * * 1 ≡ − ′ ′ + α α α w h w h n f s              (19) 
  () () () ( ) [] 0 * * * * 1 ≡ − ′ + w w h w h n f s α α .             (20)  
It is easy to see (19) and (20) again give us equation (7).  It follows that changes 
in   leave   unchanged, assuming, for now, that  s w α  is fixed.  
Next note that (20) can be rewritten as  





w h n f s
α
α = ′ +               (21) 
  26If   increases, since we know   is unchanged, it follows that   must rise, since 
.  Hence we have established 
s * w * n














.    
This is not the end of the analysis since we have been assuming α  constant as   
changes.  In the full competitive equilibrium this need not be the case.  To see this 
suppose   rises (we could consider the case where   goes from 0 to some positive 
number).  From what we have already established we know that each firm will demand 
more labor.  Hence, the curve representing 
s
s s
( ) α U  in Fig. 3 will move down (as 
employment increases, unemployment falls).  What happens to the competitive 
equilibrium will depend on which of the several equilibria— ,  ,  —the economy 
happened to be in to start with.  If it were  , 
1 E 2 E 3 E
2 E α  would fall and, surprisingly, 
unemployment, U , will rise.  The wage will also rise, since  w α  is constant. 
But   is an unstable equilibrium, and therefore less important in reality.  Let us 
see what happens from   and  .  If the economy were at   and government gives a 
production subsidy   ( > 0), it is obvious from Fig. 3 that unemployment will fall and 
2 E
1 E 3 E 1 E
s α  
will rise.  Hence, the wage rate will decline.  This is an interesting result, and contrary to 
what is obtained in a standard neoclassical labor market model.  A policy that raises the 
demand for labor causes the wage to decline. The intuition behind this is illustrated by 
Fig. 2. 
Finally, if the economy was at  , then, since unemployment is zero to start with, 
a rise in s will leave unemployment unchanged.  The rise in demand for labor will 
simply cause wage (which in this case is above the efficiency wage level) to rise. 
3 E
  27To see how a one-time policy intervention can deflect the economy to a different 
equilibrium that we discussed earlier, suppose, to start with, the economy is at  .  As a 
subsidy  is given and steadily increased the 
1 E
s ( ) α U  curve moves down.  With that   and 
 move closer to each other.  Beyond a critical level of  , the equilibria   and  
cease to exist.  The only intersection between the 
1 E
2 E s 1 E
2 E ( ) α U  and  ( ) U α  graphs in Figure 3 
occurs at  .  So as   is raised, the labor market at some point will get deflected to the 
full-employment equilibrium,  .  So a policy of subsidy for a short period, after which 
the subsidy is withdrawn, can cause a permanent drop in unemployment. 
3 E s
3 E
5.2  Wage Subsidy 
Next, let us consider a government provided per-worker subsidy.  This is a fairly 
transparent policy intervention, which is meant to be a direct incentive to firms to hire 
more workers and cut down unemployment.  When the government provides a per 
worker subsidy the firm’s profit is as follows.   
() ( ) () ( ) s w n w nh f w n − − = α π ,                (22)  
This makes the effective wage the firm pays ( ) s w−  because the government covers part 
of the firms wage bill—  per worker—in the form of a subsidy to the firm.  The first 
order conditions to this profit maximization problem are 
s
  () () ( ) 0 1 * * * ≡ − ′ ′ α α α w h w h n f             (23) 
  () () ( )0 * * * * ≡ + − ′ s w w h w h n f α α .            (24)   
The optimal wage and number of workers employed are both a function of the 
amount of sharing and the government’s subsidy— ( ) s n , * α  and  ( ) s w , * α .  To 
  28determine the effect of the subsidy differentiate the first order conditions with respect to 





























′ ′ − ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′













f h h f hn h f
h f h n f h h f
α α
α α α
           (25)  
 














.  The government is 
essentially paying the firm to hire more workers.  By paying the subsidy per worker the 
firm only gets the benefit of   when they add an additional worker.  An increase in   
leads directly to an increase in the optimal amount of workers employed by the firm.  If 
the government subsidizes the wage bill of firms in such a way that the total subsidy paid 
to the firm increases with the number of workers hired then labor will be effectively 
cheaper for firms and they will hire more of workers. 
s s
Like before, to complete the analysis we have to go from this study of α -
equilibrium to the full-competitive equilibrium.  The analysis is similar to what was 
conducted above and so will not be repeated.   The result is, that just like an output 
subsidy, a per-worker subsidy given for a short period and then withdrawn can cause a 
permanent drop in unemployment. 
Again, the multiple equilibria result established in section 3 dictates that this 
subsidy need not be persistent.  The government has the ability to deflect the labor market 
into a high-employment equilibrium with a one time intervention that increases the 
demand for labor and reduces sharing in that period.  The magnitude required for such a 
  29subsidy to be successful depends on the amount of current sharing within the community 
and consequently on the current unemployment level. 
6.  Conclusion 
We have shown that there can be multiple equilibria in a labor market if firms act 
according to the standard efficiency wage theory and, in addition, laborers share part of 
their income with the unemployed members of their community.  The equilibria differ in 
their levels of unemployment and income sharing—an equilibrium with high 
unemployment will be supported by a high level of sharing which, in turn, reinforces the 
high unemployment, and an equilibrium with low or no unemployment will yield a small 
amount of income sharing and this will reinforce the low unemployment. 
  The analysis leads to natural policy questions such as: Can we cause an 
equilibrium to shift so that unemployment becomes lower?  Can we actually shift an 
economy from the high unemployment equilibrium to the low unemployment 
equilibrium? Are there policies that can alter the equilibrium wage? A variety of 
interventions were studied in the paper, from minimum wage laws to subsidizing firms in 
different ways to induce them to demand more labor. We obtained results that are 
expected but also some that are surprising.   
  There is scope for discussing many other policies using the model developed in 
the paper.  One natural candidate is the use of unemployment dole or welfare for those 
out of jobs.  Without going into full details note that, if the government were to announce 
an unemployment subsidy to the unemployed persons, then income sharing in the 
economy would decrease because there would not be as much need for the employed to 
support those who are out of work. Hence, laborers, who would now be consuming a 
  30larger portion of their own wages, would become more valuable in the production 
process.  Firms would thereby increase their employment of labor and hire from the pool 
of unemployed.  This would decrease the unemployment rate in the community. So it 
seems arguable that the actual subsidy the government would have to dole out would not 
be as large as it would have appeared when the subsidy was first announced. Moreover, it 
is possible that in response to the intervention the economy moves to a situation, which 
was an equilibrium (with lower unemployment) of the original economy. If this happens, 
then the subsidy can eventually be removed and we could still have the economy remain 
at the low unemployment equilibrium.  
  Less apparent policies that can be discussed using this model are in the realm of 
family planning and fertility policy.  Lemma 1 has an interesting implication about the 
relation between fertility and unemployment.  Note that a society with lower fertility has 
a lower  .  Hence, by equation 1, a society with lower fertility will have a higher  d α .  By 
Lemma 1, such a society will have a higher demand for labor. Interesting questions arise 
if we treat fertility as a choice variable, something that is decided by a process of 
negotiation within the household (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999), 
instead of being exogenously fixed, as assumed here.  Households can then have fewer 
children and signal their higher α . Governments could also use this argument to justify 
certain interventions concerning family size. This is a matter deserving of future 
investigation. 
  Finally, in the spirit of what we have already seen above, one can use a minimum 
wage law not for perennially holding up the wages but to deflect the economy to a pre-
existing equilibrium, akin to what was derived in Basu (2000) in the context of child 
  31labor. Basically, unlike more conventional labor market interventions, the model we have 
creates the scope for interventions which can be a one-time measure to deflect the 
economy from one equilibrium to another, more-desirable equilibrium.  The idea of the 
paper was to outline a model which opens up the possibility of more systematic research 
into these kinds of unusual ‘transitory’ policy interventions for tackling the problem of 
unemployment. 
  What is particularly interesting is that a zero-unemployment equilibrium could 
have a higher market wage for labor than the high unemployment equilibrium.  If short-
term government intervention is effective in shifting the economy from high 
unemployment to zero unemployment, the reduction in income sharing brought about by 
this could increase the demand for labor so much that it exceeds the supply of labor and 
the new outcome is sustained as an equilibrium, with no further government intervention 
needed.  Firms are compelled by natural market forces to operate according to the 
reservation wage, which is above the efficiency wage, and so end up paying higher wages 
and employing more people.  This contradicts the notion that, in a competitive labor 
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